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Abstract
In the traditional model of Bertrand price competition among symmetric firms, there is no 
restriction on the number of firms that are active in equilibrium. A symmetric equilibrium exists 
with the different firms sharing the market. I show that this does not hold if we preserve the 
symmetry between firms but introduce moral hazard with a customer-sensitive probability of 
exposure; competition necessarily results in a natural monopoly with only one active firm. 
Sequential price announcements and early adoption are some equilibrium selection mechanisms 
that help to pin down the identity of the natural monopolist. If we modify the standard Bertrand 
assumptions to introduce decreasing returns to scale, a natural oligopoly will emerge instead of a 
natural monopoly. The insights of the basic model are robust to many extensions.
Keywords: Bertrand competition, active firms, moral hazard, natural monopoly.
JEL Codes: D82, D43, C73.
1. Introduction
The traditional Bertrand model of price competition between identical firms producing a 
homogenous product yields a straightforward symmetric equilibrium in which consumers divide 
their demand among these firms, which price at cost. The model imposes no restrictions on the 
number of active firms in equilibrium. The present paper shows that if we allow identical 
Bertrand competitors to experience moral hazard (given an opportunity to cheat their customers) 
then given a customer-sensitive probability of detection of wrong-doing, there is only one active 
firm in any non-collusive equilibrium. Moreover, this is so despite the fact that all firms have the 
same costs and that no firm is assumed to have an incumbency advantage. The single active firm 
does not charge the monopoly price, but rather the lowest price compatible with maintaining its 
credibility; we refer to it as a natural monopolist rather than a standard monopolist.When we 
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2relax some of our assumptions, for instance, when we allow for imperfect information 
transmission between customers, we still find that at least some potential entrants remain inactive 
in equilibrium, obtaining either a natural monopoly or a natural oligopoly with an endogenously 
determined number of active firms. This is also the case when the traditional assumptions of the 
Bertrand model are modified by, for instance, allowing for price competition within the 
framework of increasing costs and not just constant costs. Thus, this paper contributes both to the 
literature on Bertrand competition and to that on the impact of asymmetric information on 
market structure. It also touches more tangentially on two other literatures – the network effects 
and the multimarket contact literature.
While much of the literature on Bertrand competition has concentrated on the Bertrand 
paradox – the implication that price drops sharply from the monopoly price to the competitive 
price when the number of firms in the industry increases from one to two, and that the 
equilibrium price remains insensitive to further increases in the number of firms – this is not the 
focus of the present paper. This paper is more closely connected to the rather more limited 
literature that touches on the number of active firms within Bertrand competition. This includes 
Rasmusenand Janssen (2002), Novshek and Roy Chowdhury (2003), and Ledvina and Sircar 
(2011). My paper differs from theirs both in terms of its approach and its results.
In Rasmusenand Janssen (2002), each firm may be inactive with some probability; the 
authors motivate this in terms of firms endogenously choosing whether to incur a fixed cost of 
activity. In Novshek and Roy Chowdhury (2003), under Bertrand competition with free entry, 
some firms may choose to set a price that generates no sales, thus remaining inactive. In both of 
these papers, the inactivity of some firms in equilibrium stems from actions taken by these firms 
(whether or not to incur a fixed cost of activity, or what price to charge). In my paper, in 
contrast, all potential entrants take identical actions, but customers choose to patronize only one 
firm; the others perforce remain inactive.2 (In the case of imperfect information transmission or 
diseconomies of scale, they may choose to patronize a determinate number of firms greater than 
one).In Ledvina and Sircar (2011), asymmetry of costs between firms producing a homogenous 
good under Bertrand competition is critical for some firms to be inactive; with symmetric costs, 
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3either all firms are active, or all firms are inactive. In my paper, in contrast, all firms have 
symmetric costs, but in the main model only one firm is active. There are no equilibria in which 
all firms are active or all firms inactive.
I now briefly explain the intuition underlying the customers’ behavior in my model. This 
stems from an interaction between firm-customer moral hazard problems and inter-firm Bertrand 
competition. Each potential entrant has the opportunity to cheat his customers by promising a 
high-quality product but supplying a low-quality one. The product’s quality is unverifiable on 
inspection. However, a low-quality product sold to any one customer has a certain probability of 
failure. The more customers the firm sells its inferior product to, the greater the chance that a 
piece sold to at least one customer fails. Customers publicize product failures, ensuring that a 
cheating firm is punished. For the threat of punishment to constitute an effective deterrent, firms 
who supply high quality must earn a premium over cost (whose existence would be threatened 
by a punishment), and must charge a minimum “credibility price” in the spirit of Klein and 
Leffler (1981).3 Unlike Klein and Leffler, in my model this threshold price is sensitive to the 
number of customers a firm has; a firm with more customers faces a higher probability of being 
caught if it cheats, weakening its cheating incentives. Therefore, it can guarantee high quality 
provision even if it charges a relatively low price; the minimum credibility price is decreasing in 
the firm’s customer base. Now, under Bertrand competition, the credible threat of undercutting 
by rivals ensures that the price is driven down to this minimum. However, when all firms charge 
this minimum price, any outcome in which customers go to more than one firm is not credible 
and hence cannot be sustained as an equilibrium. (Charging a low price already weakens 
incentives for high quality provision, and a low number of customers per firm would further 
weaken these incentives).
Papers that deal with the effect of asymmetric information (moral hazard or adverse 
selection) on market structure include Farrell (1986) on moral hazard as an entry barrier, and 
Dell’Ariccia et al (1999) on adverse selection in a Bertrand competition model. In Farrell (1986), 
an incumbent firm is known to its customers as a supplier of high quality; a potential entrant’s 
quality is unknown. The paper derives conditions under which the possibility of moral hazard 
ensures that the incumbent retains its monopoly. In Dell’Ariccia et al, a pair of incumbent banks 
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4engage in Bertrand competition, and have an informational advantage over later potential 
entrants; they have better information about risky borrowers whom they have previously 
encountered. This advantage then blocks further entry. My paper, which involves moral hazard, 
differs from these papers in not assuming a pre-existing incumbent. This eliminates the issue of 
an incumbency advantage in information or reputation. All potential entrants enter the market at 
the same time in my model; customers, however, will choose to buy from only one in any 
equilibrium (or from a determinate small number in the extensions).
The discussion so far shows that my paper emphasizes how the addition of moral hazard, 
with a customer-sensitive probability of detection and exposure, changes the standard Bertrand 
competition equilibrium, in particular leading to the emergence of a natural monopoly in 
equilibrium even when all firms have symmetric costs and no firm is an incumbent.A symmetric 
equilibrium where demand is divided among all the entrants no longer obtains. I now briefly 
attempt to compare my paper with two other literatures – that on network effects and that on 
multi-market contact – to which it is more tangentially related. 
Farrell and Klemperer (2007) survey the literature on network effects. Most network 
effects are technological, and arise when the nature of the product ensures that a user’s benefit to 
adopting the product increases when the number of other users rises. For example, this may 
happen due to compatibility issues. Network effects also occur due to complementarities with 
other products. Indirect network effects arise when a larger number of buyers also attracts a large 
number of sellers, so that each individual buyer then gains from being able to interact with more 
parties on the other side of the market.
While these technological network effects – both direct and indirect – create herding 
behavior, which also occurs in our model, they are quite different from the forces that we model. 
In our model, no assumptions are needed on the technical nature of the product. Different 
potential entrants in our model are in fact all selling exactly the same product, so there is no issue 
of compatibility. However, it is still optimal for consumers to flock to the same firm, because not 
doing so generates moral hazard on the part of the firm. Firms cannot counter this increased 
moral hazard by charging higher prices, due to the presence of Bertrand competition and the risk 
of being undercut.
5Somewhat closer to our model are pecuniary network effects (Liebowitz and Margolis 
1994, Farrell and Klemperer 2007). Here, increased adoption by other users benefits all users by 
lowering the price of the product. However, the underlying micro-foundations of pecuniary 
network effects are unclear (Farrell and Klemperer 2007). In our model, the minimum price that 
would render a producer a credible high-quality seller is decreasing in the producer’s number of 
customers; due to the increased probability of getting caught, a seller with many customers will 
fear to cheat even if the profits he foregoes from exposure are relatively modest. Bertrand 
competition ensures that the price is driven down to this minimum, while only one firm survives 
the process, as all the customers in the industry flock to it.The equilibrium price therefore 
depends negatively on the total number of customers in the industry. Thus, our model provides 
some micro-foundations for pecuniary external economies of scale (we should not call them 
“network effects” as different sellers sell the same product in our model). 
My paper differs from the multi-market contact literature4 in several important respects. 
First, while this literature shows how multiplicity (across markets or products) enables a seller to 
maintain a high (monopoly) price, my paper (which deals with multiplicity across clients or 
transactions rather than markets) shows that a seller with multiple clients can credibly sustain a 
low price, thereby becoming a natural monopolist (rather than a standard monopolist) in an 
environment with price competition and moral hazard.5 Secondly, these papers, unlike mine, do 
not deal with Bertrand competition. Third, I do not deal with umbrella branding.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains the basic version of the 
model and the main result. After presenting the main result, we perform several robustness 
exercises in Section 3, relaxing the assumptions of the basic model. Specifically, we investigate 
(i) what happens if the rate of information transmission decays among customers, (ii) what 
happens if making a product failure public knowledge becomes costly, (iii) what happens if there 
is a small probability that a truly high quality product may fail, as well, (iv) how the results are 
affected by dropping the traditional Bertrand assumption of constant costs, and allowing for 
decreasing returns within the price competition framework, and (v) what happens if firms do not 
have identical costs.  Section 4 concludes with a discussion of possible policy implications. The 
appendices contain further robustness exercises. While the paper concentrates on non-
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6cooperative equilibria, in which firms compete rather than collude, the appendix also contains a 
brief discussion of the conditions under which an equilibrium with collusive price-fixing among 
different potential entrants will not be sustainable.6
2. The Game : the basic model and main results
2.1 Players and Technology
The players in the game are N firms – all potential entrants into a market – and a total of X
customers, where X is larger than N. Firms and customers are infinitely lived and have a common 
discount factor of δ. In our basic model, all firms have identical costs (we will later briefly
consider the effects of introducing asymmetry) and produce the same product. They incur a cost 
cHin order to produce a single unit of a high-quality product; their corresponding cost for low-
quality provision is cL<cH. Product quality is however not verifiable on inspection.
Customers, who are also all identical, each buy a single unit of the product from a firm of 
their choice. They value a unit of the high-quality product at vH>cH, so that high quality 
provision is efficient. Low quality is valued at vL<cL, so that no consumer would willingly buy 
low quality. Therefore, all agreements between firms and customers involve high-quality 
production.
Suppose however that a firm cheats by supplying a low-quality product instead of a high-
quality one. Low quality products probabilistically fail after they have been purchased, revealing 
their low quality. Let q(x)be the probability that a firm with x customers that cheats by supplying 
low quality instead of high is detected and exposed. It is easy to see that q is an increasing 
function of x; the probability that the product sold to at least one customer fails, revealing its low 
quality, is higher when it has been sold to a relatively large number of customers.7 [As an 
example, if we assume that the probability of a low-quality product sold to any one customer 
failing is q, then if product failures are independent across customers, we would have q(x) = 1-
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7(1-q)x.8] We assume that any such information instantly becomes public knowledge; any 
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A1: q(X) < 1,
A2: vH>cH+(1-δ)(cH-cL)/δq(X),
recalling that X is the total number of customers.
2.2 Timing and equilibrium concept
The timing of moves is as follows.
1. Each firm publicly announces a price Pi, i ε [1,….N], at which it will sell its high-quality 
product.9
2. Customers observe these announcements and sign purchase orders, choosing which firms 
to order (high-quality) products from. Each customer orders a single unit.
3. Each firm observes the volume of its purchase orders, decides on product quality, and 
sells at its announced price.
4. Customers observe whether the products they have purchased fail. If they do, they 
announce the failure on a public forum.
5. Steps 2 to 4 are repeated indefinitely.
Our equilibrium concept is pure strategy Nash equilibrium. We will focus on the class of 
symmetric pure strategy NE.
We now make a clarification about notation. As clear from the timing of the game, firms 
announce prices before observing the volume of purchase orders, x. However, in what follows, I 
use the notation P(x) to denote a threshold “credibility” price. This denotes the mathematical fact 
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8that the threshold is affected by the number of customers but does not imply that a firm observes 
the number of customers before announcing a price. While one can think of a firm rationally 
anticipating the number of its clients in equilibrium and announcing a price that reflects this, the 
unique equilibrium of our model does not even rely on this, but only depends on firms knowing 
the total client size, X.As we will see later, each firm’s dominant strategy leads it to announce a 
price that is only a function of the total number of clients X; this is regardless of the way in 
which customers are expected to divide their custom among firms.
2.3 A Preliminary Result
Lemma 1.Define P(x) =cH+(1-δ)(cH-cL)/δq(x). If a firm with x customers charges less thanP(x), 
it cannot convince its customers that it will supply high quality. Moreover, this “minimum 
credibility price” is decreasing in the firm’s customer base.
Proof: Consider the cheating incentives of a firm with x customers. By supplying low quality 
instead of high quality, the firm saves on its cost of production, obtaining one-time cheating gains 
of cH-cL. However, by cheating, the firm runs a risk q(x) of being exposed and being punished by 
consumers. It is subgame perfect for consumers to respond with a punishment which represents 
their strategy in a one-shot Nash equilibrium; boycotting the cheating firm.10 Therefore, in the 
event of exposure the firm would lose the present discounted value of its future profits from 
honest high quality supply. The no-cheating constraint is therefore
cH-cL<q(x) δ(Pi -cH)/(1-δ)                                                 (1)
or
Pi ≥cH+(1-δ)(cH-cL)/δq(x) = P(x)                                            (1a)
A firm with x customers must charge a price of at leastP(x) to convince customers that it is not 
going to cheat. If not, no one buys from it, as consumers never willingly buy low quality from 
our assumptions. The RHS of(1a)is decreasing in q(x), and therefore in x. A firm with a higher 
number of customers, therefore, is able to signal credibility at a lower price than one with fewer 
customers.QED
We now use Lemma 1 to obtain our main result.
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92.4 A Natural Monopoly with Bertrand Competition
So far, we have not discussed competition between firms. Firms compete through Bertrand price 
competition. While consumers are interested in ensuring that the firm(s) they buy from are 
credible suppliers of high quality, subject to this, they prefer buying from a firm that charges a 
lower price than its competitors. As is traditional in the Bertrand model, our main focus is on 
equilibria that result from active competition, rather than on possibilities of collusive price-fixing 
between firms; however, for completeness, we discuss the latter theme in an appendix. 
It is well-known that with Bertrand competition among firms with symmetric costs, an 
equilibrium exists in which these firms share the market. However, I find that adding moral 
hazard with a customer-sensitive probability of exposure, as I have done, drastically changes this 
result, so that any non-collusive equilibrium involves only one active firm.11 This is a surprising 
result in view of the fact that all firms have symmetric costs, and moreover, that since all firms 
enter at the same time, there is no pre-existing incumbent. The single active firm would most 
accurately be described as a natural monopolist, and not as a standard monopolist (it does not 
charge the monopoly price, but the lowest price compatible with high-quality supply), though the 
presence of moral hazard means that it earns above-normal profits. (If not, it would have an 
incentive to cheat by supplying low quality; the presence of above-normal rents which it would 
forego by cheating is necessary to ensure credible high-quality supply). We now prove our chief 
result, using Lemma 1.
Proposition 1.Any non-collusive equilibrium of the game described in section 2.2 involves only 
one active firm servicing the entire market. This firm charges P(X).
Proof: The proof proceeds in a couple of steps.
Step 1.In this step, we show that it is optimal for each of the N potential entrants to announce Pi 
= P(X) = cH+(1-δ)(cH-cL)/δq(X)(obtained by substituting X for x from equation 1(a)), regardless 
of how they expect consumers to divide their demand across firms. Suppose, to the contrary, that 
firm i charges a lower price, Pi’. Now, from Lemma 1, for any feasible xi , we have P(xi) ≥ 
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P(X)(with strict inequality for any xi < X), therefore, we have Pi’<P(xi). But then, individual 
customers know that regardless of firm i’s total number of customers, it has the incentive to 
supply low quality. They therefore do not buy from firm i. Hence, this is an unprofitable strategy 
for firm i. Next, suppose that firm i charges some Pi’ >P(X). Then, any competitor can undercut 
firm i by charging a price slightly below Pi’, thus luring away all of firm i’s potential customers. 
Knowing this, the firm will not charge a higher price, either.
Step 2.In this step, we show that when all firms announce P(X), every possible equilibrium
involves all customers signing up with the same firm, so that there is only one active firm in 
equilibrium. Suppose, to the contrary, that there is an equilibrium with L active firms, where L is 
any integer in the range [2, N]. Assume, without loss of generality, that market demand is evenly 
divided among these L firms, so that each active firm services X/L customers. But then, the no-
cheating constraint (1) is violated; with only X/L customers, each firm must charge a price of at 
least P(X/L) to be credible. However, they are charging only P(X) <P(X/L), and therefore have 
the incentive to cheat. Knowing this, customers do not buy from them, a contradiction. However, 
it is an equilibrium for all customers to sign up with the same firm; as the firm has X customers, 
it will supply high quality at price P(X). From A2, this price is always strictly less than the 
highest price that customers are willing to pay, so that such an equilibrium always exists. 
Moreover, this firm earns supernormal profits in equilibrium, since P(X)>cH (by definition). 
QED
The intuition underlying Proposition 1 stems from the interaction of price competition 
and the sensitivity of cheating incentives to the customer base. If customers split their demand 
among rival firms, each firm has a relatively small customer base, which implies that an 
individual firm’s chances of being detected and exposed in low-quality provision are smaller. To 
offset this increased moral hazard, firms would then need to charge a higher price to convince 
customers of their intentions to supply high quality. However, if they do so, they are vulnerable 
to being undercut by a rival. The highest price which rules out undercutting is sufficiently low 
that credibility requires all customers to sign up with just one firm, which thus becomes a natural 
monopolist.
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2.5 Equilibrium selection
Proposition 1 shows that any non-collusive equilibrium involves a single active firm. Given the 
symmetry between firms, there are N such equilibria, which only differ from each other in the 
identity of the firm that becomes the natural monopolist. This multiplicity can be eliminated by 
using either of two plausible equilibrium selection devices.
The first possibility is allowing firms to make sequential price announcements in step 1 
of the game.12 One possible mechanism would be to allow all potential entrants to draw an 
integer from 1 to N, and make their announcements in the order specified by the integer they 
drew. In this case, all customers will flock to the first firm that announces P(X). The order of 
announcement serves as a co-ordinating device allowing all customers to decide which firm to 
collectively patronize.
The second possibility, often referred to in the literature on network effects, is early 
adoption. This device assumes that some customers are “leaders” who decide, before other 
customers do, which firm they wish to buy from. Other customers can observe the actions of the 
leaders, and follow them. In our model, they would always do so; if there is a designated “early 
adopter” among the customers, and he signs up with a particular firm, all other customers will 
find it in their interest to sign up with the same firm.
3. Robustness
We now modify some of the assumptions in the previous analysis to see how our results are 
affected.
3.1 Imperfect transmission of information about product failure
So far we assumed that when low quality is detected by an individual customer, he is able to 
make this knowledge public with probability 1. However, in communities in which the customer 
base does not have access to sophisticated technology (i.e. the internet), and extends beyond a 
small network (where personal ties would suffice to spread information), this would not 
necessarily be the case. Now, let the probability that a discovery of cheating is publicized be 
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τ(x)where τ’ < 0 (the larger the customer base, the less easy it is to transmit information) and τ” 
< 0 (the rate of information transmission decays at an increasing rate). The probability of 
detection continues to be denoted by q(x), q’> 0. Then, a firm with x customers runs an overall 
risk of q(x)τ(x) of being punished by its entire customer base for supplying low quality. Now, the 
no-cheating constraint (1) changes to
cH-cL<q(x)τ(x) δ(Pi -cH)/(1-δ)                                                 (2)
yielding
Pi ≥cH+(1-δ)(cH-cL)/δq(x)τ(x)  = P(x)                                            (2a)
Observation 1.Suppose that (i) q”< 0, and (ii) 
│?? ??? ? │ ? ??? ?? < ? ′(?? ) ? (?? )? . Then the 
equilibrium outcome is either a natural monopoly or a natural oligopoly with an endogenously 
determined scale.
Proof: Differentiating (2a) with respect to x, we obtain
P’(x) =
? ? ?? (?? − ?? ) ? ? ? ?(? )? (? )(? (? ))? − ??(? )? (? )(?(? ))? ?                                     (3)
The derivative is zero at x* such that 
q’(x*)/q(x*) = - τ’(x*)/τ(x*)                                                     (4)
Differentiating (3) a second time, we obtain
P”(x) =
? ? ?? (?? − ?? ) ?? ? "?? ? + ? (? ?)??? ? + ? ? ???? ? ? ? − ?"? ? ? + ? (? ?)?? ? ? ?> 0                          (5)
given q’> 0, q” < 0, τ’ < 0, τ” < 0. Thus P(x) is minimized at x*. Moreover, from condition (ii)13
of the Observation, x* >X/N (which would be the number of clients per firm if all N firms were 
active in a symmetric outcome). Now, there are two possibilities. In the first, x* > X, so that 
P’(X) < 0, in which case, just as in Lemma 1, the minimum credibility price is unambiguously 
decreasing in the customer base, and a natural monopoly obtains by mimicking the proof of 
Proposition 1. In the second possibility, there is some x* <X which solves (4). In this case, it is 
easy to prove that a natural oligopoly emerges with X/x* active firms14, each with x* customers, 
and charging P(x*). To see this, note that Step 1 of Proposition 1 now applies to P(x*); 
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announcing this price is a dominant strategy for all firms. As P(x*)≤P(x) for all feasible x, 
charging a price below P(x*) convinces customers that the firm will cheat, while charging a 
higher price leaves the possibility of undercutting open. Confining our attention to symmetric 
equilibria, next note that if customers divide themselves among more than X/x* firms, each firm 
will have a customer base smaller than x*, which implies that the no-cheating constraint (2) 
would be violated at price P(x*). However, if customers divide themselves among less than X/x* 
firms, each firm has a customer base larger than x*, which again violates the no-cheating 
constraint, as the price required for credibility with such a large customer base is strictly more 
than P(x*). Thus the equilibrium cannot involve either too many or too few active firms. QED
The parameter restrictions imposed in Observation 1 have the following interpretation. 
Condition (ii) ensures that the rate at which information diffusion decays with the customer base 
must not overpower the rate at which detection probability of low quality increases with the 
customer base, for very low client sizes. Condition (i) requires that the detection probability be 
concave in client size, which is true of many detection technologies; for instance, it is the case 
when probabilities of failure are independent across customers, so that q(x) = 1- (1-q)x. Note 
however that condition (i) is only a sufficient, and not a necessary, condition for Observation 1 to 
hold. Thus, subject to these conditions, we find again that Bertrand competition, even with 
symmetric firms, always results in an equilibrium with either one active firm, or with a few 
active firms where the number of firms is determined by (4). There is no equilibrium in which 
customers symmetrically divide their demand among all N potential entrants.
3.2 Costly information transmission
In this subsection, we look at the implications of assuming that dissatisfied customers incur a 
cost to publicize a product failure, relaxing the assumption of costless information transmission 
in the basic model.
Assume that spreading information about a product failure involves a cost of θ>0. 
However, disgruntled customers obtain some satisfaction from ensuring that a low quality 
provider is punished by others. Suppose this “vindication” yields a customer-specific utility of ?? , 
where the subscript denotes an individual customer, and κis distributed with a density function of 
f  and a cdf of F. Then, it is straightforward to see that customers who experience product failures 
will publicize them if and only if ?? > ? for these customers. Therefore, the probability that a 
14
cheating firm with a clientele of x is exposed changes from q(x) in the main model to (1-
F(θ))q(x) in this modified model. It is easy to see that with this modification, the threshold 
minimum credibility price continues to be a decreasing function of firm clientele, and that 
Proposition 1 goes through.
3.3 A small chance of failure of a high quality product
In the main model, truly high quality products do not fail. However, suppose there is a small 
margin of error or aberration causing a truly high quality product to fail with a small probability 
μ. The probability that a high quality product sold to x customers fails at least for one customer is 
denoted by μ(x). The corresponding probability for a low quality product continues to be denoted 
by q(x). Since a high quality product failure is an aberration, while a low quality product failure 
is a common occurrence, we have μ(x)<q(x) for all x.
In what follows, we see that given an additional, reasonable condition, our natural 
monopoly result remains unchanged. The condition implies that the ratio of the probabilities of at 
least one low quality product failure to at least one high quality product failure increases in the 
number of customers buying products. Essentially, the relative probability of an aberration 
decreases with a rising number of trials.
Observation 2.Let 
? (? )? (? ) be an increasing function of x. Then the equilibrium outcome is a natural 
monopoly.
Proof: The condition above implies that? ?(? )? (? ) < ? (? )? ?(? )                                                              (6)
Since q(x)>μ(x), (6) also implies that? ?(? ) < ? ?(? )                                                                                    (7)
The no-cheating constraint, (1), is modified in two ways when high quality products may fail. 
First, the lifetime payoff to a firm from honest high quality supply decreases to reflect the 
probability that it might go out of business for no fault of its own; a high quality product failure 
results in the same collective boycott, as customers cannot tell from a product failure whether the 
product was high or low quality. Secondly, the expected penalty of a cheat also changes; while it 
realizes that it will lose its future payoffs with probability q(x), it also knows that with a lower 
probability μ(x), it would lose these payoffs anyway, even if it did not cheat. Thus (1) changes to
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?? − ?? < (? (? ) − ? (? )) ? (? ? ?? )(? ? ? ? ? ? (? ))                                         (8)
yielding ? ≥ ?? + (?? ? ?? )(? ? ? ? ? ? (? ))? (? (? )? ? (? )) = P(x)                                        (8a)
Differentiating (8a) with respect to x, and simplifying, we find that P’(x) has the same sign as? ?? ?(? )? (? ) − ? (? )? ?(? )? − (1 − ? )?? ?(? ) − ? ?(? )? < 0
where the negative sign follows from (6) and (7). Thus, we have P’(x)<0. As this holds for all x, 
we also have P’(X)<0, and the natural monopoly result follows from mimicking the proof of 
Proposition 1. QED
3.4 Decreasing returns to scale in the production function
We now modify the standard Bertrand assumptions of constant cost. Assume that the unit cost of 
production is increasing in the scale of production (decreasing returns to scale), so that we have 
cH’(x) > 0. Following standard assumptions on marginal cost, we also have cH” ≥ 0. Also, for 
simplicity, assume that the scale of production affects unit costs similarly for both high and low 
quality production, so that the cheating gains cH – cLremain independent of x. For instance, this 
would be the case if producing high rather than low quality required a fixed investment, such as 
on a machine, so that the quality cost differential were independent of scale. This is however not 
an essential assumption; appendix B works out the case where we allow the marginal cost of high 
quality production to exceed that of low quality production. As in the previous subsection, 
assume that the detection technology is concave in x.
It turns out that this modification also leads to the emergence of a natural oligopoly, again 
with an endogenously determined number of firms. (1a) is now modified to
Pi ≥cH(x)+(1-δ)(cH-cL)/δq(x) = P(x)                              (9)
Differentiating (9) with respect to x, we obtain
P’(x) = ??? (? ) − (? ? ? )(?? ? ?? )? ? ?(? )(? (? ))?                               (10)
Differentiating again, we obtain
P”(x) = ?? "	 − (? ? ? )(?? ? ?? )? [? "? ? − ? (? ?)?? ? ] > 0                              (11)
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The convexity of P(x) ensures that the solution obtained by setting (10) equal to zero represents a 
minimum. Again, the interesting parameter space is where this solution, x**, is an interior 
minimum.15 Then, any symmetric equilibrium involves X/x** active firms, each charging P(x**). 
The proof is very similar to that of Observation 1.
This shows that our results are qualitatively robust to allowing for increasing costs.
3.5 Asymmetric firms
Instead of assuming that all firms have identical costs, if we allow for one firm k to have lower 
costs than the other N-1 firms, it is easy to see that Bertrand competition again leads to a natural 
monopoly, with firm k emerging as the natural monopolist. Specifically, suppose that cH(k) = cH
– ε, cL(k) = cL– ε, while cH and cLcontinue to represent the other N-1 firms’ costs of high and low 
quality provision respectively. (The results also hold if firm k has an advantage only in high 
quality production and not in low quality production). Then, firm k can charge any price in the 
semi-open interval [P(X)-ε, P(X)) where P(X) = cH+(1-δ)(cH-cL)/δq(X)(obtained by substituting X 
for x in 1(a)). By doing so, it maintains its credibility at a price which cannot be credibly matched 
by its competitors, and therefore emerges as the natural monopolist.
That Bertrand competition leads to a natural monopoly when one firm has a cost 
advantage is not as surprising as our main result that this happens even when all firms are
symmetric, and that, moreover, any non-collusive equilibrium has only one active firm 
(Proposition 1). Nonetheless, we include this result for completeness.
4. Conclusion
This paper integrates a model of moral hazard in the product market with one of Bertrand price 
competition between potential entrants in a market where no one firm has an incumbency 
advantage. It shows that provided a firm’s probability of getting exposed cheating is increasing in 
the number of its customers, all possible equilibria involve only one active firm. This firm is a 
natural monopolist and charges the lowest price compatible with credibility. In particular, the 
standard symmetric Bertrand equilibrium in which customers divide their demand among the 
different firms (which price at cost) will never obtain. Though, in our model, the equilibrium 
                                                          
15As long as diseconomies of scale at very small client sizes (X/N) are not too strong, either a natural oligopoly or a 
natural monopoly obtains – the latter if x** > X.
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price is higher than the competitive price (due to moral hazard considerations), our emphasis is 
not on this, but on the fact that just one firm operates in equilibrium. Moreover, this result holds 
regardless of the fact that all firms are symmetric in their costs, and no firm has an incumbency 
advantage.
When we modify our assumptions, allowing for imperfect information dissemination 
among customers (so that the probability of getting exposed is not monotonic in the customer 
base), we obtain a natural oligopoly instead of a natural monopoly. The number of firms is 
endogenously determined and it remains true that it is not an equilibrium for customers to divide 
their demand among all potential entrants. Moreover, our insights are robust to a number of other 
modifications in assumptions, as shown in Section 3.
In terms of policy implications, our results suggest that concerns about promoting greater 
competition in an industry with one or very few active players may be misguided or 
unproductive, especially if the good being sold is an experience good subject to quality concerns. 
Even if the competitive environment is already very favorable, as with Bertrand price 
competition, moral hazard may ensure that customers direct all their demand to one (or a very 
few) firms, so that few active players operate in equilibrium. On the other hand, improving the 
rate of information transmission, by increasing the probability that a cheat is exposed, lowers the 
minimum credibility price, which, along with price competition, lowers the equilibrium price 
P(X); therefore, achieving this would result in the natural monopolist charging a lower 
equilibrium price. It would, however, not raise the number of active firms in equilibrium.
This paper contributes both to the literature on Bertrand competition and to that on the 
effect of asymmetric information on market structure. It also provides some possible micro-
foundations for pecuniary external economies of scale, showing how moral hazard concerns 
combined with competitive mechanisms lead to an inverse relationship between industry size and 
the equilibrium price charged by a competitive firm. 
Appendix A: collusion
The body of the paper concentrates on non-collusive equilibria, in which firms compete actively 
and do not co-operate. Here, we examine their incentives to collude, agreeing to collectively 
share the market while charging the monopoly price. This price is vH in our model.
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Appendix result 1: Suppose that δ≤ (N-1)/N. Then, an equilibrium where firms collude cannot be 
sustained.
Proof: Suppose the N potential entrants agree to collude, charging the monopoly price vHfor a 
high quality product. Note that for collusion to work, all N entrants must agree to collude; if not, 
they can always be undercut by a potential entrant who is not party to the agreement. Each firm’s 
discounted profits from adhering to the monopoly agreement are [vH-cH]X/N(1-δ). A single 
participant firm’s one-time profits from undercutting the others and grabbing the whole market is 
[vH-cH-α]X, where α is any very small number. As α →0, the one-time profit from deviation 
approaches [vH-cH]X. Deviation would imply the breakdown of the agreement, so that all N firms 
compete in subsequent periods. From our previous results, in this outcome firms charge P(X) and 
expect, with equal probability, to be the natural monopolist. Expected discounted profits in this 
outcome are then δ[P(X)-cH]X/N(1-δ) = (cH-cL)X/q(X)N (using 1(a)). Thus, the collusive 
agreement breaks down if ? ? − ??1 − ? ?? < [? ? − ?? ]? + ?? − ??? (? ) ??
which simplifies to ? (? ) ? ?? ? ? − ? ? < ?? ? ??? ? ? ??                               (12)
If the condition mentioned in Appendix Result 1 holds, that is, if δ≤ (N-1)/N, the LHS of (12) 
becomes nonpositive; since its RHS is positive, (12) therefore necessarily holds. Thus the 
condition is sufficient (though not necessary) to rule out a collusive equilibrium. QED
Appendix B: Decreasing returns to scale with cH’ >cL’
Consider the model of section 3.4, but now suppose the marginal cost of high quality production 
exceeds that of low quality production, so that the cheating gains cH – cL are an increasing 
function of x. Moreover, suppose that cH” ≥ cL” ; the rate at which marginal cost rises with 
production is weakly higher for high quality products. Now, instead of equations (10) and (11), 
we have
P’(x) = ??? (? ) + (? ? ? )? [??? ? ???? (? ) − (?? ? ?? )? ?(? )?? (? )?? ]                           (13)
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and
P”(x) = ?? "	 − (? ? ? )? [{?? − ?? }{? "? ? − ? (? ?)?? ? } − ?? "? ?? "? + ? ? ?(??? ? ??? )? ? ]                   (14)
Appendix result 2: Suppose diseconomies of scale are small at low levels of x, so that P’(X/N)< 
0. Let x^ be the value of x obtained by setting (13) equal to zero. Then, a sufficient condition for 
either a natural monopoly or a natural oligopoly with X/x^ firms to emerge in equilibrium is that 
the probability of detection q be more elastic with respect to customer base x than the cheating 
gains are.
Proof: The condition on elasticities implies that ??? ? ????? ? ?? ? < ? ?? ? (15)
Manipulating and cross-multiplying, we obtain ? ? ?(??? ? ??? )? ? < ? (?? ? ?? )(? ?)?? ?                              (15’)
From (15’), we see that the expression in square brackets in (14) is clearly negative, so that we 
have P”(x)> 0. From this, we see that x^ minimizes P(x). Moreover, as P’(X/N)<0and P”(x)> 0, 
we must have x^>X/N. If x^>X, we have P’(X) < 0 and a natural monopoly obtains; if x^<X, we 
have a natural oligopoly with X/x^ firms. The proof for this part of the result mimics that of the 
latter part of Observation 1. QED
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